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a b s t r a c t
Recently, Zhang et al. proposed two encryption schemes using an elliptic curve combined
public key. We show, via the trick of using a linear equation system, that both proposals
are vulnerable to key recovery attack, and thus in the present form must be considered as
insecure. We simulate our trick on a common personal laptop and always get the results at
a sub-second level.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Mathematical problems can serve as sound foundations for constructing public key schemes, such as the RSA algorithm
and the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) based on the difficulties of factoring large integers or computing discrete
logarithms in suitably represented finite cyclic groups. In a combined public key (CPK) scheme, the user’s private key and
public key are computed via a mapping algorithm and key matrices [1]. Recently, Zhang et al. presented identity based
encryption schemes using the ECC CPK [2].
When we consider the goal of attacking public key encryption, the first thing that comes to mind is reconstructing the
private key for the given public key. The security notion of key privacy requires that the private key cannot be derived from
the public key, although the keys are related mathematically. Of course, it may be possible that one finds some ‘‘clever way’’
of decrypting a ciphertext without actually knowing the secret key. For example, term indistinguishability formalizes the
inability to learn any information about the plaintextM underlying a challenge ciphertext C , capturing a stronger notion of
privacy [3,4].
By using the linear equation system trick, we show that the Zhang et al. schemes cannot achieve the key privacy property,
let alone the indistinguishability goal. In our method, one may re-derive either the master key of the system or the private
key of the user in the system, given the public system parameters. Note that if the master key is compromised, all messages
protected over the entire lifetime of the public–private key pair are also compromised [2].
2. A proposal based on a combined public key
In this section we briefly review the first of the two schemes proposed by Zhang et al. For further details we refer the
reader to the original paper [2]. The next section will point out its pitfalls, meaning that by solving the linear equation
system anyone can find the master key of the system or the private key of the user in the system. Our method remains valid
in attacking the second scheme of Zhang et al., as the two proposals share the same key extraction mechanism.
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Initialization: This algorithm and the next one are run by the most trusted system administrator, called PKG (private key
generator).
1. Generate G and GT of prime order p with an admissible bilinear map e:G × G −→ GT , P the generator of G
and a random point Q in G.
2. Choose two hash functions H: {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, H0:GT → {0, 1}n.
3. Pick out n random numbers xi ∈ Z∗p, i = 1, . . . , n, and set X = (x1, . . . , xn) as the secret master key of the
system.
4. Compute yi = xiP, i = 1, . . . , n, and set Y = (y1, . . . , yn).
5. Set (G,GT , e, n,H,H0, P,Q , Y ) as the public system parameters.
Keyextract: Given a user’s identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, let xID =ni=1 hixi mod p be the secret key of the user, where hi is the ith
bit of H(ID), i = 1, . . . , n.
Encrypt: On input ofM and the receiver’s identity ID, this algorithm executes the following:
1. Derive the public key of the receiver: yID =ni=1 hiyi, where hi is the ith bit of H(ID), i = 1, . . . , n.
2. Choose r ∈R Z∗p randomly, and output C = (rP,M ⊕ H0(e(Q , yID)r)) .
Decrypt: On input of C = (C1, C2) and the private key of the receiver xID, the algorithm outputsM = C2 ⊕ H0(e(xIDQ , C1)).
3. Pitfalls in the Zhang et al. scheme
In the present form, the Zhang et al. scheme recalled in the previous section cannot be considered as secure in the sense
of key privacy. The following theorem explains this.
Theorem 3.1. The Zhang et al. scheme does not satisfy the requirement of key privacy, meaning that in the exact model that they
defined, anyone can reveal either the master key of the system or the users’ private keys.
Proof. We show the details of how one (sayA) can recover themaster key or the private keys, given the system parameters
(G,GT , e, n,H,H0, P,Q , Y ), while the master key X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is only known to the PKG. Below is the explicit
procedure for A, and all the computations are modulus p. A’s behavior is fully restricted within the security model that
Zhang et al. defined in [2].
1. Choose n user identities ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn randomly.
2. Submit ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn to PKG and receive the corresponding private keys xID1 , xID2 , . . . , xIDn , s.t. xIDi =
n
k=1 hikxk
mod p, i = 1, . . . , n, where hik is the kth bit of H(IDi).
3. Solve the system of linear congruence equations
h11x1 + h12x2 + · · · + h1nxn ≡ xID1 mod p
h21x1 + h22x2 + · · · + h2nxn ≡ xID2 mod p· · · · ·
hn1x1 + hn2x2 + · · · + hnnxn ≡ xIDn mod p
(1)
and, according to the solution, output themaster key (x1, x2, . . . , xn) or the private key of some user. To bemore specific,
see below.
Since all equations in (1) have the common modulus p, A may first represent it as a matrix equation of the form
HXT ≡ bmod p, where H is an n× nmatrix, and b is a column vector with n entries:
H =
h1h2· · ·
hn
 =
 h11 h12 · · · · · h1nh21 h22 · · · · · h2n· · · · ·
hn1 hn2 · · · · · hnn
 , XT =
 x1x2· · ·
xn
 , b =
xID1xID2· · ·
xIDn
 (2)
and then dealwith the systemby transforming it to some simple but equivalent one, based onmodular arithmetic properties.
To this end, many candidate algorithms are available. For example, elementary row operations can be used to reduce a given
system to either triangular or echelon form [5]. At the end of the operations,Awill eventually knowwhether the equations
of the linear system (1) are independent (namely, none of the equations can be derived algebraically from the others).
– If the equations are linearly independent (we call this Event∗), thenA can use back substitution to find the single unique
solution (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of the system above (note that p is a large prime number). ThereforeA obtains the master key
of the PKG and thus totally defeats the system. This process has a complexity of O (n3) [5] and can be easily performed
since the order of magnitude of the length n is 2, typically [6].
– If the equations are dependent, then from the above elementary row operations,Awill know the maximal number, say
t , of linearly independent rows of H , say hi1 , hi2 , . . . , hit , 1 ≤ i1, i2, . . . , it ≤ n, t < n. Let U = {IDi1 , IDi2 , . . . , IDit },
S = {hi1 , hi2 , . . . , hit }; then none of the vectors in S is expressible as a linear combination of the other vectors in S, i.e., S
is a linearly independent set.Amay further do the following:
(a) Pick out an identity IDc of some other user arbitrarily, s.t. IDc ∉ {ID1, . . . , IDn}U .
(b) Compute hc = (hc1, hc2, . . . , hcn), where hci is the ith bit of H(IDc), i = 1, . . . , n.
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(c) Form amatrix with the vectors in S and hc as the rows, and calculate its reduced row echelon form to decide whether
these vectors are linearly dependent. If not, update U and S below:
U = U

{IDc}, S = S

{hc};
· if |U|(= |S|) = n, then A may submit to PKG the identities in U \ {IDi1 , IDi2 , . . . , IDit } and further re-derive the
master key of the PKG as in Event∗, and thusA achieves the goal;
· otherwise, go to step (a). (Note that even in the worst case, this may happen only n− t times.)
(d) Express hc as a linear combination of the vectors in S:
hc =

hi∈S
cihi. (3)
(e) Submit to PKG the identities in U \ {IDi1 , IDi2 , . . . , IDit } and obtain the corresponding private keys.
(f) Output the private key of the user with identity IDc as
xIDc =

hi∈S
cixIDi .
Indeed, Eq. (3) implies that the inner product of hc and X equals that of

hi∈S cihi and X:
hc · X =

hi∈S
cihi

· X =

hi∈S
ci(hi · X) =

hi∈S
cixIDi .
As the private key of the user with identity IDc is xIDc = hc · X ,Awill eventually obtain xIDc which is supposed to be
only known to PKG and the user with identity IDc .
Putting all of this together, we can conclude thatAmay reveal the master key of the PKG or the private key of the user
in the system even ifA’s behavior is fully restricted in the exact security model that Zhang et al. defined [2]. 
Since n is far less than the large prime number p, e.g., |p| = 160, it is not a hard task for the readers to implement
A’s procedure. Actually, we used Mathematica [7] to simulate A many times (with |p| = 160, n = 128, 160 or larger)
and always got the results at a sub-second level each time. All tests were run on a notebook with an Intel Core Duo T7500
2.20 GHz processor and 2 GB RAM using Windows Vista.
As the two schemes of Zhang et al. share the same key generation mechanism, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.2. The second scheme of Zhang et al. does not satisfy the requirement of key privacy, meaning that in the exact model
that they defined anyone can reveal either the master key of the system or the users’ private keys.
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